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Purpose – IPv6 is the replacement for the Internet’s incumbent protocol, IPv4.  IPv6 
adoption is required to allow the Internet to continue to grow; however, there has been 
almost no uptake since its standardisation in the late 1990s.  This paper seeks to explain 
how this non-adoption may be a consequence of current policies paradoxically intended 
to promote IPv6. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Economic theories of exhaustible resources and 
permit markets are used to provide an explanation for the lack of adoption of IPv6. 
 
Findings – The current policy approach will not yield a significant adoption of IPv6 
until after the IPv4 address space is exhausted and may also constrain Internet growth 
after IPv4 exhaustion occurs. 
 
Practical implications – Current policies intended to promote IPv6 diffusion through 
the Internet must be reconsidered.  The economics of permit markets in particular can 
inform discussions about IPv4 address transfer markets. 
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“The problem of address scarcity is as severe for the Internet economy as the 
oil shocks and gasoline shortages of the 1970s were to the industrial 
economy” (Mueller, 2008). 
 
The above quotation paints a dire picture for the Internet, and by extension for 
economies in which the Internet is currently, or expected to be, a critical piece of 
infrastructure.  The core of the problem is that IP addresses – which are to the Internet 
what telephone numbers are to the telephone network – are fixed in number and rapidly 
running out.  Exhaustion is currently projected to occur between 2011 and 2012[1], at 
which point future growth of the Internet will be constrained. 
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The vast majority of previous literature surrounding this issue has focused on 
technological aspects.  This paper departs from this pattern and investigates the problem 
from the perspective of economics.  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
first, a brief orientation to the history and background of the problem is provided.  
Second, current obstacles to a solution are discussed.  This is followed by an application 
of two different economic theories to the problem.  Finally, the paper finishes with 
discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Background to the problem 
 
All computers connected to the Internet need a unique IP address.  The protocol 
currently used as the basis for Internet communications is Internet Protocol version 4 
(IPv4), and the addresses in use today are thus referred to as IPv4 addresses.  Although 
IPv4 addresses are typically expressed as four numbers separated by dots, they are 
actually a single, 32-bit number.  Thus, a total of 2
32
 – approximately 4.3 billion – 
possible addresses exist.   
 
This is clearly inadequate for future needs.  The Internet has grown exponentially to its 
current point and this trend seems likely to continue due to economic development and 
a growing global population, and the fact that more and more technologies are being 
designed with Internet connectivity in mind.  This includes those that are still in their 
infancy, such as sensor-webs, and those that do not yet exist.  It is possible that demand 
for Internet addresses could run into the tens or even hundreds of billions.   
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There were warnings about the eventual exhaustion of the 32-bit IPv4 address space 
even before the massive wave of commercial Internet adoption that took place during 
the mid-1990s.  The RFC1287 memorandum, issued by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) in 1991, describes routing and addressing as “the most urgent architectural 
problem, as it is directly involved in the ability of the Internet to continue to grow 
successfully”. 
 
Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) was standardised in 1993 by RFC1518 and 
RFC1519 as a medium-term measure to slow the rate at which IPv4 address space was 
depleted, thus extending the useful life of IPv4 to the projected dates mentioned above.  
CIDR tackled supply by enabling more flexible address allocation policies and thus 
minimising the proportion of wasted – allocated but unused – addresses.  Today, CIDR 
is universal and there are now few gains to be made from further improvements to 
address supply.   
 
Meanwhile, Network Address Translation (NAT), standardised in 1994 by RFC1631, 
tackled demand by allowing a single address to be used to connect an entire network, 
where previously a single address had been required for each device on that network.  
The introduction of NAT has introduced technical problems for a wide range of 
protocols and services, which in turn has led to the development of a range of 
“workarounds”, the most common of which are NAT-PMP (NAT Port Management 
Protocol), TURN (Traversal Using Relay NAT), STUN (Standard Traversal of UDP 
through NAT) and ICE (Internet Control Exchange).  Unfortunately, none of these are 
universal and each introduces its own technical problems. 
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Nevertheless, NAT is now the de facto means for connecting networks to the Internet 
and further impact on demand is unlikely.  While implementing multiple NAT systems, 
sometimes called “layered NAT”, could in theory be used to reduce demand for IPv4 
addresses, this is not a desirable solution to future address shortage as it compounds the 
problems NAT introduces, as well as introducing performance problems. 
 
Concurrently with the development of CIDR and NAT, a new version of Internet 
Protocol was developed as a long-term solution to the problems with IPv4.  IP version 5 
(IPv5) had already been created as an experimental version to test media streaming 
features, and therefore the name given to the version set to replace IPv4 was IP version 
6 (IPv6).  IPv6 was officially standardised in 1995 in RFC1883, followed by an updated 
version in 1998 (RFC2460). 
 
The principal advantage of IPv6 is that it has a much larger address space – 128 bits, as 
opposed to IPv4’s 32 bits – and this provides an extraordinarily large number of 
addresses: 3.4×10
38
 addresses, or 6.7×10
23
 addresses for every square metre of the 
Earth’s surface.  Indeed, it has been said that this is sufficient for a unique address for 
every grain of sand on Earth (Wiljakka, 2002).   
 
Nevertheless, it is now at least 19 years since the initial warnings about IPv4 address 
space and more than a decade since the final version of IPv6 was published, and yet 
IPv6 adoption is still negligible (Domingues et al., 2007; Joseph et al., 2007).  Indeed, a 
projection based on current trends anticipates that 80% diffusion of IPv6 could take 
between another 8 and 22 years (Elmore et al., 2008).  Of course, trends can change and 
such projections may thus prove to be inaccurate; however, such projections do show 
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that it is unlikely that significant adoption will occur before the IPv4 address space is 
exhausted, and that there are still significant barriers to IPv6 adoption.  The following 
section examines these barriers in more detail. 
 
3. Current barriers to IPv6 adoption 
 
Hovav et al. (2004) proposed the Internet Standards Adoption (ISA) model, which 
describes individual adoption decisions in terms of how useful the technology is to the 
organisation and how conducive the organisation’s environment is to adoption.  Both 
usefulness (UF) and environmental factors (EC) can be high or low, leading to four 
categories: Status Quo (low UF and low EC), Replacement (low UF and high EC), 
Niche (high UF and low EC) and Full Implementation (high UF and high EC).  Given 
the almost complete lack of adoption of IPv6 to date, it is clear that almost every 
organisation is firmly within the Status Quo quadrant. 
Hovav et al. (2004) proposed the Internet Standards Adoption (ISA) model, which 
describes individual adoption decisions in terms of how useful the technology is to the 
organisation and how conducive the organisation’s environment is to adoption.  Both 
usefulness (UF) and environmental factors (EC) can be high or low, leading to the 2×2 
matrix shown in Figure 1.  Given the almost complete lack of adoption of IPv6 to date, 
it is clear that almost every organisation is firmly within the Status Quo quadrant. 
 
[ FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE ] 
 
That IPv6 is not perceived as useful is hardly surprising.  Technologically superior 
features of IPv6, such as improved security, mobility and Quality of Service (QoS), do 
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not offer the same level of advantage over IPv4 that IPv4 offered over its predecessor 
(Huston, 2007) – the benefits are primarily long-term rather than immediate (Bohlin and 
Lindmark, 2002), and the belief that there is no business case for IPv6 is widespread 
(Roberts, 2009).  Indeed, the primary benefit of IPv6 – a vastly expanded address space 
– is not relevant to organisations that already have sufficient IPv4 address space and 
have no immediate need for expansion.  Further, the impending IPv4 run-out is not 
likely to occur until approximately 2011-2012 – very soon from a “whole of Internet” 
point of view but far enough into the future to be less worrying for individual firms 
concerned only with their own networks.  Thus, rightly or wrongly, it is unlikely that 
most organisations will perceive IPv6 as useful. 
 
The current environment for IPv6 is also extremely unconducive to adoption.  IPv4 is 
ubiquitous, and this would create high drag, inertia and conversion costs should an 
organisation decide to adopt IPv6 (Bohlin and Lindmark, 2002; Hovav et al., 2004).  
Further, most organisations have little access to IPv6 skills and experience (c.f.Warfield, 
2003; Dell et al., 2007) and there have also been few monetary incentives or 
opportunities for sponsorship available in most countries.  
 
Even in the albeit rare case where an organisation might fall in the coexistence, 
replacement or full implementation quadrants, the opportunities to obtain an IPv6 
connection from an Internet Service Provider (ISP) are extremely limited.  As at January 
2009, there were only 44 ISPs or similar organisations worldwide that provide native 
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Init Seven  
Nexellent 
France Jaguar Network 
Nerim 
Proxad / Free SAS 
Wanadoo France 
Italy ITGate Panservice 
Ireland Airwire  
Canada Epik Networks  
Ukraine NetAssist  
Finland Nebula  
Estonia Linxtelecom  
Netherlands BIT  
Australia Internode  
Table 1: ISPs offering native IPv6 to customers 
Source: SixXS (2009), IPv6Style (2009) 
 
Examination of the ISPs in Table 1 shows that 14 are Japanese, with few options 
available in other countries.  The majority do not have a significant market share and 
therefore it is presumed that they are capable of only limited capacity.  Indeed, Ladid 
(2008) reported that only seven of the world’s biggest (by revenue) 21 
telecommunications companies were IPv6 ready, and only two of those – NTT and 
KDDI – had retail IPv6 offerings.  Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that although 
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native IPv6 services do exist, they are extremely rare and that IPv6 is not yet 
significantly diffused. 
 
Even if an organisation is willing to use one of the very few providers from whom IPv6 
services are available, they must also consider which of a number of “gateway 
technologies” (David and Bunn, 1988) they intend to use to provide interconnection 
between IPv6 and IPv4.  Three such technologies have been proposed over the years.  
First, “dual-stacking” was suggested, in which computers had both IPv4 and IPv6 
installed.  This is no longer relevant as a mainstream transition mechanism, as the 
looming exhaustion of IPv4 address space will render it impossible for new connections 
to run native IPv4 in parallel with native IPv6. 
 
A second gateway technology involves the implementation of protocol translation 
systems such as NAT-PT (Network Address Translation – Protocol Translation) and 
NAPT-PT (Network Address Port Translator – Protocol Translation) in order to connect 
their own IPv6 network to IPv4 service providers, or passing IPv6 traffic through IPv4 
“tunnels” to IPv6 tunnel brokers elsewhere on the Internet.  NAT-PT and NAPT-PT 
standards were first put forward in 2000 (RFC2766), however after several years this 
approach still faced serious technical challenges and was abandoned as a transition 
mechanism in 2007 (RFC4966). 
 
A third gateway technology that has been proposed is the use of “tunnels” to connect 
IPv6 networks across an IPv4 backbone.  To the minimal extent that IPv6 has been 
implemented – typically in experimental, hobbyist, and test environments – tunnels 
have been the approach most often used. 
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Regardless of which gateway is used, gateway technologies are typically only adopted 
when the benefits derived from improved system performance and beneficial network 
effects outweigh the costs imposed on those who adopt them (David and Bunn, 1988).  
In the case of the IPv6 and its associated gateways, the costs have almost invariably 
outweighed the benefits, and significant adoption of IPv6 has not occurred.  Tunnelling 
imposes extra costs and degrades performance and thus is likely to be considered 
unacceptable for important or critical services.  Consequently, it remains difficult – if 
not impossible – to put forward a business case for IPv6 adoption. 
 
4. Economic perspectives of the IPv6 transition 
 
Clearly, initiatives to promote update of IPv6 have largely not succeeded, a fact which 
may well be due to an absence of relevant theoretical or empirical research to inform 
them.  Despite a reliance on market economics to promote the diffusion of IPv6 in many 
countries, there have been very few serious discussions to date of the economics of IPv4 
and IPv6. 
 
First, Bohlin and Lindmark (2002) considered the individual firm’s incentive to invest 
in IPv6 and view the issue as an example of the Boiteux problem, in which the decision 
to invest in maintenance of an existing system appears rational when considering local 
issues, but is irrational when one takes in the global perspective.  Thus, individual firms 
continue to invest in stop-gap measures such as NAT to extend the life of IPv4; 
however, this is inefficient when one considers the Internet as a whole. 
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Second, Mueller’s (2006) examination of IP addressing policy concluded that there is 
significant room for variation and called for further research to identify optimal address 
policies.  Any effort to introduce change had been blocked by the existing policy regime; 
however, subsequent to Mueller’s (2006) analysis, three proposals for address transfer 
markets of various forms have been put forward by various RIRs (ARIN 2008-2, RIPE 
2007-08 and APNIC Prop50). 
 
It is possible that a market mechanism might encourage IPv6 adoption by giving the 
holders of IPv4 address space the incentive to relinquish their IPv4 space and make the 
transition to IPv6 (Edelman, 2009).  However, others do not share this confidence in the 
ability of a market to promote the IPv6 transition.  Mueller (2008) asserts that a 
successful market would not prevent the eventual transition to IPv6 but could prolong it 
by extending the life of the IPv4 address space.  On the other hand, Lehr et al. (2008) 
argue that the transition may stall if IPv4-holding incumbents were to become 
sufficiently powerful to be able to preserve the status quo.  Finally, Lehr et al. suggest 
that it is not guaranteed that such a market would even work at all, for example if 
sufficient buyers or sellers cannot be attracted to the market. 
 
In summary, economies around the world are increasingly reliant on a global 
communications network that is fast reaching a point at which further growth will be 
problematic.  Despite being a major economic issue, economic analyses of the transition 
from IPv4 to IPv6 are few.  Three RIRs have recently put forward proposals for a 
market for the transfer of IPv4 address space and these currently form a focus of debate, 
however it may be difficult to evaluate the impact of such proposals on the transition to 
IPv6 in the absence of related literature. 
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To help rectify this situation, this paper now turns to such an examination of the IPv6 
transition in which two approaches are considered: the economics of exhaustible 
resources and the economics of permit markets.  If no transfer market ends up being 
implemented, the economics of exhaustible resources can explain the behaviour of IPv4 
address space consumption.  In the case that an IPv4 address transfer market is adopted, 
the economics of permit markets would seem to have explanatory power.  These two 
theories are discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.1. Economics of exhaustible resources 
 
Economic analysis of exhaustible resources is not a new discipline; there is extensive 
literature on the subject from Hotelling’s (1931) ground-breaking paper to the present 
day.  The study of exhaustible resources typically has tended to focus on natural 
resources, particularly minerals and energy, but can be applied to any exhaustible 
resource.  Considering IPv4 address space as an exhaustible resource which is being 
depleted in much the same way as the world’s oil reserves are being depleted gives a 
valuable insight into any transition from IPv4 to IPv6 under market forces. 
 
The essence of the Hotelling’s analysis – now known as the “Hotelling Rule” – is that 
efficiency and competitive market forces will result in an increasing scarcity rent of an 
exhaustible resource that is equal to the interest rate.  In other words, increasing scarcity 
of a resource contributes to increasing market price.  Eventually, the market price of the 
exhaustible resource reaches the backstop price, and the backstop technology (Nordhaus, 
1992) becomes more economical.  It has been argued by some that for this reason, 
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“exhaustible resources” are never actually exhausted.  In the case of IPv4 addresses, 
depending on the address allocation policy that prevails at the time it may be that the 
market price does not reach the backstop price, but there may be administrative 
difficulties in obtaining new addresses.  In other words, it may be that the administrative 
burden for obtaining an IPv4 address will be more costly than that required for 
obtaining an IPv6 address. 
 
In monopolistic situations, production is equal to demand at the current market price.  If 
the net price rises too slowly, production shifts forward due to increased demand, 
leading to earlier exhaustion.  Similarly, if the net price rises too quickly, the producer 
is inclined to keep its resources in the ground to maximise return (Solow, 1974). 
 
The former is exactly what is happening in the case of IPv4 addresses.  The market 
price of IP addresses cannot be observed because there is no IP address market.  As 
Mueller (2006) observes, government agencies are not subject to market forces, so 
actual prices for IP address allocation – levied indirectly through other fees, but 
effectively the price one must pay to obtain address space – almost certainly do not 
reflect the price that would be obtained in an IP address market.  The artificially low 
price thus promotes increased consumption of IPv4 addresses. 
 
It is also possible to see evidence of economics of exhaustible resources in the 
“production” of IPv4 addresses.  The monopolistic “producer” of IPv4 addresses is the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which is operated by the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and is responsible for the 
global coordination of IP address space allocation.  The IANA allocates IPv4 addresses 
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to the various Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) according to their needs.  RIRs in turn 
allocate address space to Local Internet Registries (LIRs), which are effectively 
customers and are usually Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 
 
Address allocation policies typically prevent stockpiling of addresses and require the 
LIR be able to demonstrate a need for the address space.  In other words, the production 
of IPv4 addresses is done in response to demand, just as Hotelling’s analysis of 
exhaustible resources predicts. 
 
If one accepts that IP address space consumption obeys the Hotelling Rule, it follows 
that significant uptake of IPv6 will not occur until IPv4 address space becomes more 
expensive than IPv6 address space.  However, given that the “market price” of IPv4 
address space is artificial it may well be the case that it never reaches the backstop price, 
in which case IPv6 uptake will only begin when IPv4 address space is completely 
exhausted, as illustrated in Figure 12.  In any case, economic theory of exhaustible 
resources predicts that meaningful IPv6 diffusion does not commence until the point 
where further IPv4 deployment ceases, resulting in a sudden – as opposed to gradual – 
transition. 
 
[ FIGURE 2 1 AROUND HERE ] 
 
This model assumes that IPv6 addresses can be directly substituted for IPv4 addresses, 
albeit at a higher cost; however, this assumption may be incorrect.  Roberts (2009) 
suggests that in the event of IPv4 address space exhaustion, most organisations may 
simply increase their use of NAT, while very few would adopt IPv6.  If this eventuated, 
 15
deployment of new services and Internet diffusion in developing countries would be 
constrained. 
 
Regardless of which of these two scenarios one regards as more likely, neither is 
desirable.  While the latter case has obvious disadvantages – the inability to serve new 
markets and offer new services – the former case is also undesirable.  To conduct the 
inevitable IPv6 migration only as a response to the complete exhaustion of IPv4 address 
space would be a risky strategy as the inevitable time pressures in such a situation 
would lead to ad hoc and unplanned actions.  Indeed, serious problems with 
interoperability may result in a fragmented Internet if the transition to IPv6 is not 
properly managed, posing significant reliability issues for critical infrastructure (SIFT, 
2007), and likely significantly higher cost of conversion than if the process was able to 
be planned in advance (Klensin, 2002). 
 
4.2. Permit markets 
 
Permit markets have been increasingly used as a means for environmental regulation, 
particularly since the 1980s.  Issues such as carbon trading, regulating water 
consumption, sustainable fisheries, regulating the taxi industry, the phasing out of 
leaded petrol and limiting the emissions of chlorofluorocarbons and sulphur dioxide 
have all been subject to various schemes around the world, although not all schemes are 
alike.  They are designed to meet specific objectives and will have varying rules 
concerning permit pricing, allocation and subsequent trading, and are subject to a 
variety of different monitoring and enforcement regimes. 
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Since it is impossible to connect to the Internet without an IP address, these can be 
considered analogous to a permit to connect to the network.  There are a fixed number 
of “IPv4 permits”, and IP address allocation policies typically prohibit on-selling or 
subletting of addresses; thus, IP addresses are currently analogous to non-tradeable 
permits.  Indeed, non-tradable permits can be conceptualised as a method for allocating 
a scarce resource (Leffevre, 2005), and this objective is an explicitly stated policy goal 
of the RIRs and is recommended in RFC2050. 
 
Current policy is that IPv4 addresses are technically free and in practice require only the 
payment of a nominal annual membership fee to the RIR and to be able to meet the 
most basic of eligibility criteria – essentially to be able to demonstrate a need for the 
address space.  As long as IPv4 permits continue to be allocated on this basis, firms will 
continue to have very little motivation to adopt IPv6 – in fact, it is likely that they will 
remain more motivated to continue using IPv4 due to network effects.   
 
If this policy does not change, firms will continue to use IPv4 address space until it is 
completely exhausted, after which point they will have no choice but to adopt IPv6 or to 
restrict the number of connections to the Internet.  Of course, this is how permit markets 
are intended to operate – a maximum number of permits is decided upon that allows an 
industry to function while restricting the impact of negative externalities to a 
satisfactory level.  The only significant difference with IPv4 “permits” is simply that the 




The exhaustion of the IPv4 address space will lead to the creation of scarcity rents for 
IPv4 addresses.  It therefore may be desirable to allow the trading of IPv4 permits, as 
recommended by Mueller (2006; 2008) and Edelman (2009).  The three proposals put 
forward by ARIN, RIPE and APNIC thus effectively transform IPv4 addresses into 
tradeable permits.  If issues concerning address aggregation can be dealt with 
adequately, allowing IPv4 address trading via an appropriate market design would seem 
to be potentially advantageous for a number of reasons. 
 
First, it is extremely unlikely that a central entity that issues non-tradeable permits will 
have access to enough information to allocate permits in a way that yields the greatest 
benefit.  It is thus extremely unlikely that the IANA, RIRs, and so on can effectively 
judge which applicants for IPv4 address space will use addresses in ways that maximise 
public benefit.  Applicants themselves are more likely to have the best information 
about their needs than the RIRs, and applicants could also have an incentive to 
misrepresent this information to the RIRs if RIRs were to use it to make allocation 
decisions.  Further, such information may be commercially sensitive and applicants may 
be unwilling to provide it to RIRs (Lehr et al., 2008).   
 
Second, non-tradeable permits tend to be static and unresponsive to changing social 
values (Howe, 1996).  This is evident in the way IPv4 address space has been allocated 
– many address blocks that were inefficiently allocated early in the development of the 
Internet remain with the original applicants, resulting in large amounts of allocated but 
un-used address space.   
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Third, non-tradeable permits imply that a consumer cannot benefit directly from trade 
even if there are opportunities to reduce consumption of the regulated resource[2] 
(Vollebergh et al., 1997).  Thus, even if an organisation could reduce their use of IPv4 
address space, there would be little incentive to do so (Edelman, 2009). 
 
In contrast, permits move to applications with the highest value in competitive markets 
in which trading is allowed (Montgomery, 1972).  Indeed, this is true regardless of 
whether permits are auctioned or issued for free.  When permits are issued for free and 
permit trading is allowed, total expenditure on permits is equal to the cost of the permit 
system objective, i.e. the cost of emission control or restricting fishery catches to 
sustainable levels (Montgomery, 1972), or managing the transition to IPv6 in the 
current context. 
 
If IPv4 addresses were allocated free of charge and subsequently allowed to be traded, 
as is practically the case in the proposals currently put forward by the RIRs, any 
expenditure on such trades would equal the cost of restricting the (IPv4) Internet to a 
maximum size.  However, the US and Canadian experiences in allocating cellular 
licenses in the 1980s, in which there were many frivolous and speculative licence 
applications (McMillan, 1995), suggests that the current first-come-first-served 
approach to allocation would not necessarily be the most appropriate.  Thus, if address 
trading is to be allowed, auctioning may be a more appropriate method for initial IPv4 
address allocations.  While it may seem that there will be no remaining unallocated IPv4 




A counterargument to allowing the trading of IPv4 addresses is that trading permits may 
not obtain the maximum value from a resource if there are high transaction costs 
(Stavins, 1995), which may apply to the case of IPv4 address space.  The effort 
involved in renumbering networks – as would be required by trading IPv4 addresses in 
a market – is immense.  Further, trading IPv4 addresses could result in a highly 
fragmented IPv4 address space, leading to backbone routing performance problems.  
This paper thus seconds Mueller’s (2006) and Lehr et al.’s (2008) call for further 
research into the implications of such trading. 
 
A last consideration is that tradeable permits can be inequitable if the poor are forced to 
sell their permits to the rich in order to fund their own development.  Thus, it can be 
argued that permit trading consolidates the power of the rich (Leffevre, 2005).  Thus, 
any policy to allow trading of IPv4 address space would need to include measures to 
minimise this outcome (through initial address allocations, for example). 
 
Lehr et al., (2008) note that all three of the mechanisms currently put forward by the 
RIRs address this by disallowing inter-regional trading.  Meanwhile, Mueller (2008) 
disputes whether inter-regional trading would harm developing countries at all.  Indeed, 
as developing countries are likely to experience stronger demand than developed 
countries, it is likely that exhaustion – without a mechanism to re-use previously 
allocated addresses – would hurt developing countries more than those already 
developed. 
 
I return here to the question of auctioning of permits.  Although the free allocation vs. 
auction question may seem a moot point in the event of IPv4 exhaustion, this is not 
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necessarily the case.  IPv4 address space is not allocated in perpetuity; rather, it is 
“licensed” to address holders for a specified period (typically one year), at the 
conclusion of which it may be renewed.  For example, ARIN’s policy is as follows: 
 
“An annual fee for registered space is due by the anniversary date of the 
ISP's first allocation from ARIN.  ISPs should take care to ensure that their 
annual renewal payment is made by their anniversary due date in 
accordance with the Registration Services Agreement.  If not paid by the 
anniversary date, the address space may be revoked” (ARIN, 2010). 
 
Similarly, APNIC (2010) requires address space to be renewed on an annual basis: 
“APNIC will allocate and assign Internet resources on a ‘license’ basis, with such 
licenses to be of specific limited duration (normally one year).”  RIPE and LACNIC do 
not make the annual renewal explicit; however, membership of the RIR is required in 
order to hold address space, and such membership requires the payment of an annual fee, 
creating a de facto annual renewal requirement. 
 
This has some similarities to Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System (VQS), which has 
operated in Singapore since 1990 (Olszewski and Turner, 1993).  Under the VQS a 
fixed number of Certificates of Entitlement (COE) are offered by tender each month.  A 
COE is required in order to register a new vehicle, and therefore a COE is effectively a 
“vehicle ownership permit”.  COEs remain valid for a fixed period (10 years), after 
which they must be renewed at the prevailing price.  If a consumer buys a second-hand 
vehicle they must also pay the prevailing price when that vehicle reaches 10 years of 
age.  As some consumers choose not to renew the COE, new COEs can be auctioned 
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without increasing their overall number.  This system has contributed to reduced car 
ownership in Singapore (Lam and Toan, 2006). 
 
If it were possible to reserve some unallocated IPv4 address space for auction after the 
remainder is exhausted, it would be possible to identify a prevailing price.  Henceforth, 
in a similar way to the VQS, one possible IPv4 market mechanism might be to require 
incumbent address holders to renew IPv4 address permits at the prevailing price.  Thus, 
stronger demand for IPv4 address space would be at least partly counteracted by greater 
incentive for incumbents to make the transition to IPv6.  IPv4 address space not 
renewed could be available for subsequent auctions.  The possibility of this or a similar 
model is deserving of further investigation. 
 
Finally, the impact of different market-based instruments on technology diffusion is 
subject to only limited agreement.  Some contend that auctioning permits also results in 
greater diffusion of alternative technologies than other instruments (Milliman and 
Prince, 1989, 1992), while others argue that taxes provide greater incentive (Denicolò, 
1999).  Jaffe et al. (2002: 53) review the literature and decide that “unambiguous 
exhaustive ranking of instruments is not possible on the basis of theory alone”; indeed, 
each case needs to be considered on its own merits. 
 
Figure 23 illustrates two possible scenarios for IPv6 diffusion through the lens of the 
economics of permit markets.  It is likely that significant IPv6 diffusion will not 
commence until IPv4 exhaustion is reached.  At that point a range of trajectories are 
possible, depending on the policy that is adopted at that point – whether IP address 
trading is allowed, and whether IPv4 addresses are taxed, auctioned, grand-fathered or 
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freely allocated on a first-come-first-served basis.  It is assumed that the maximum 
demand for IP addresses would not exceed exponential growth, but that different policy 
frameworks will yield different levels of diffusion. 
 
[ FIGURE 23 AROUND HERE ] 
 
This is clearly a similar result to the previous analysis based on the economics of 
exhaustible resources and is undesirable for the same reasons. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Economic theory of exhaustible resources suggests that a safe and effective transition to 
IPv6 will not occur if current policies do not change.  The prevailing policy approach 
will only yield significant IPv6 diffusion after IPv4 exhaustion has already occurred, 
which would likely create reliability and connectivity problems.   
 
Three market models have recently been put forward for discussion by the RIRs.  If a 
market for trading IPv4 addresses were to be implemented it could be considered as a 
permit market for Internet connectivity, and thus lessons from the economics of permit 
markets have illustrative power.  In particular, such a market could allow permits to 
move to applications of the highest value and to respond to changing social values. 
 
However, determining the impact of permit markets on technology diffusion requires 
analysis on a case-by-case basis and cannot be determined by theory alone, and it is 
perhaps for this reason that there is disagreement in the literature about the impact 
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address trading would have on IPv6 diffusion.  Given that none of the three models 
have ever been implemented, discussion of their impact remains conjecture. 
 
One permit market which can be observed is Singapore’s VQS.  This may serve as a 
useful example for the design of an appropriate mechanism for the management of IPv4 
address space. 
 
Whatever mechanism is implemented, it is clear that something must be done in order to 
achieve the outcomes deemed necessary by the OECD: 
 
“Deploying the newer IP version 6 address blocks is necessary to enable 
growth in use of the Internet.  But making the switch is difficult and it takes 
time and resources as well as a commitment by all stakeholders, including 
governments” (OECD, 2008: 3-4). 
 
Clearly there is a need for change to the prevailing policy.  There are undoubtedly other 
options to be discussed, and this paper therefore calls for an urgent and vigorous debate 




1. See http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html (accessed 3 February 2010). 
 
2. In other tradeable permit markets – emissions trading, for example – selling of 
permits can be a source of additional capital before relocating to another country where 
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such permits are not required, negatively affecting the effectiveness of the permit 
system (Vollebergh et al., 1997).  However, in the case of IPv4 addresses such trade 
would be pointless since the IPv4 address “permit market” is global: it is not possible to 
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